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Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c) and 26(a), Appellant Kilgore
Pavement Maintenance, LLC ("KPM"), by and through its undersigned counsel Strong &
Hanni law firm, submits this brief in reply to the Brief of Appellee filed by Appellee City
of West Jordan ("Brief of Appellee" or "Opposition Brief).
ARGUMENT
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriately granted only if it appears
the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or under any state of
facts the plaintiff could prove to support its claim. Mackey v. Cannon, 996 P.2d 1081,
1084 (Utah App. 2000). When reviewing whether a district court has properly granted a
motion to dismiss under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the appellate court must accept all
factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider them and all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Canyon
Meadows Home Owners Assn. v. Wasatch County, 40P.3d 1148, 1151 (Utah App. 2001).
Contrary to this standard, West Jordan infuses its Opposition Brief with statements
of alleged fact not contained in the pleadings and not found in the record. Brief of
Appellee at 6-7, Appendices A, B, and C. Ostensibly, this stratagem is meant to create
questions of fact regarding the high price and volatility of oil from 2006 and 2008 and
whether, in fact, this was generally known by KPM at the time of contracting. Id. at 7,
22-24. Of course, these are questions of fact not considered by the district court and,
consequently, are not the subject of this Court's review. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) ("If,
on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented

4

to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56").
Suffice it to say, KPM entered into a contract with West Jordan to provide asphalt
related services that is attached to the Complaint (the "Contract"). R. 2, 28-30, 34-73.
KPM alleges that a subsequent 300% price escalation of liquid asphalt oil (the raw
material required to perform the Contract) was materially excessive, abrupt (occurring
within a period of weeks), and unforeseen, thereby causing KPM to suffer an excessive
and unreasonable cost increase, and rendering KPM's performance on the "Contract
Price"1 impracticable. R. 2-4 {Complaint atfflf9-11, 18-21).
Accepting these allegations as true, therefore, the issues before the Court are
relatively straightforward. Under the terms of the Contract and the common law rule
adopted by Utah, did KPM expressly assume the risk of a commercial impracticability
brought about by the extraordinary and unforeseen escalation of the cost of liquid asphalt
oil? R. 242 {Minute Entry ruling that "one who assumes the risk of cost increases
pursuant to contract terms cannot rely on a claim of impossibility/commercial
impracticability"). Or, as pleaded by KPM, was the risk of impracticability not bargained
for in the Contract?2 R. 4 {Complaint at ^ 19).

1

Defined in the Contract at Art. I, "Definitions." R. 35.
KPM divides this question into two specific issues for appeal: (1) Did the district court
err in determining that KPM assumed the risk of an unforeseen and extraordinary
increase in the cost of liquid asphalt oil pursuant to the parties' contract? (2) Did the
district court err in dismissing KPM's first cause of action because of its determination
that "a party who assumes the risk of cost increases pursuant to contract terms cannot rely
on a claim of impossibility/commercial impracticability? Docketing Statement at 2-4.
2

S

Setting aside the above purported questions of fact, West Jordan responds to this
query with two principal arguments. First, West Jordan asserts that under the terms of
the Contract KPM "agreed to accept the Contract Price as full payment for its
performance" and "expressly assumed the risk of increases in costs of materials,"
including the unforeseen escalation in price of liquid asphalt oil. Brief of Appellee at 8-9,
19-22.

And second, West Jordan argues that KPM cannot invoke the doctrine of

impracticability as a "sword" to rewrite the terms of a "fixed-price" Contract.3 Brief of
Appellee at 5-6, 12-14.
With respect to the former argument, the terms of the Contract and the common
law rule of impracticability adopted by Utah do not foreclose KPM's claim. Although a
party may "agree to perform in spite of impracticability," in the absence of express
language, the potential foreseeability of a particular event does not necessarily imply the
assumption of this "greater obligation." See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261
(1981) cmt. c.

In this case, West Jordan argues, and the district court apparently

concurred, that KPM contractually assumed all risks associated with the costs of
materials, including those risks that would normally excuse KPM's performance under
the doctrine of impracticability; regardless of any unforeseen increase in cost, no matter
how abrupt, and no matter how extraordinary or excessive. See R. 242-43 (Minute
Entry). However, the "four comers" of the Contract do not contain an absolute ceiling on
The former presents a question of contract interpretation; the latter, a question regarding
application of the rule of impracticability. Id
3
In its previously denied motion for summary disposition, West Jordan phrased this
argument as KPM attempting to "rewrite" the terms of the Contract. Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Disposition at 6-7.
6

the "Contract Price" or "Cost of Work" to West Jordan (EL 35)—as distinguished from
the "Work" (R. 37)—nor does the Contract include any other written provision which
conclusively evinces the parties' intent to allocate the risk of impracticability solely to
KPM. Before the district court dismissed KPM's claim, it should have considered facts
relating to the relative increase in cost to KPM and the attending circumstances of the
parties (for example, the bargaining power of the City and the inability of KPM to
negotiate an asphalt price escalation clause)4 and determined whether the impracticability
was actually foreseen and exclusively assumed by KPM. Western Prop. v. Southern
Utah Aviation, Inc., 116 P.2d 656, 659 n. 5 (Utah App. 1989) (noting that the "critical
fact" is "whether the parties actually did foresee [the event] and provide accordingly in
their contract" (emphasis in original text)); see Raytheon Co. v. Sec. of the Army, 305
F.3d 1354, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Whether performance of a particular contract would
be commercially senseless is a question of fact.").
Regarding West Jordan's latter argument, KPM is not requesting the Court
"rewrite" a fixed-price contract, nor is it seeking an untenable form of relief. Brief of
Appellee at 5-6, 12. In addition to "Work covered by [a City-approved] Change Order,"
Section 11.1(c) of the Contract provides a specific formula for determining "[t]he value
4

West Jordan argues that the inability to negotiate a price escalation clause in the
Contract necessarily implies that KPM knew of and assumed the risk of impracticability.
Brief ofAppellee at 9 and 21. This is a fact question determined by the circumstances of
the parties and should not be inferred against KPM on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261, cmt. c (stating that "[circumstances relevant in
deciding whether a party has assumed a greater obligation include his ability to have
inserted a provision in the contract expressly shifting the risk of impracticability to the
other party").
7

of. . . any claim for an increase or decrease in the Contract Price" that would include
KPM's claim. R. 51. The rule of impracticability in conjunction with this term provides
KPM an appropriate cause of action to adjust the Contract Price and compensate for the
extraordinary and unforeseen change of circumstances imposed on KPM.
KPM respectfully requests the Court reject each of West Jordan's arguments and
reinstate its impracticability claim in the district court.
I.

The terms of the Contract do not foreclose KPM's impracticability claim.
As discussed in KPM's principal brief, the primary factor for a determination of

impracticability is actual foreseeability. Western Prop., 776 P.2d at 659 n. 5. Because
the rule is also based on the principle of assent, "the critical fact is not whether the event
could have been foreseen, but rather, whether the parties actually did foresee it and
provide accordingly in their contract." Id. (emphasis in original text); see also Corbin on
Contracts § 74.15 (stating that unless an assumption of risk is "explicitly allocated to a
party," whether such an allocation was contemplated more often requires "looking at the
entire contract and other circumstances affecting the agreement").
In this case, West Jordan argues the district court properly determined that
commercial impracticability, caused by an abrupt 300% increase in the cost of liquid
asphalt oil, well beyond the normal range, was—notwithstanding the pleadings—
foreseen by the parties and exclusively assumed by KPM under the Contract. Brief of
Appellee at 11, 19-22; R. 242 {Minute Entry). West Jordan's Opposition Brief argues
that Sections 6.2(d), 9.9(c), and 11.1(a) of the Contract each memorializes this supposed
agreement of KPM to perform in spite of impracticability. Id. at 9, 21 (arguing that these
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particular Sections show KPM "expressly assumed the risk of increases in the cost of
materials"). However, only Section 11.1(a) speaks of cost and the "Contract Price." R.
51. The "responsibilities" assumed by KPM for the "Work" under Sections 6.2(d) and
9.9(c) relate to indemnification of the City under Section 6.11, KPM's means and
methods of construction under Section 9(c) and (d), warranty under Section 13.1, and the
like. R. 44, 46-47, 50, and 56. Significantly, the "Work" of KPM referenced in Sections
6.2(d) and 9.9(c), and relied upon by West Jordan to argue assumption of risk, is
distinguished from the "Cost of Work" defined in Article I. R. 35 and 37.
Regarding Contract Price, Section 11.1(a) states that "[t]he Contract Price
constitutes the total compensation (subject to City-authorized adjustments [under Section
11.1(b)])" payable to KPM and that "[a]ll duties, responsibilities, and obligations
assigned to or undertaken by [KPM] shall be at its expense without change in the
Contract Price." R. 51. But, importantly, Section 11.1(c) of the Contract also provides a
formula for changing the Contract Price outside of City-approved Change Orders. Id.
(stating that "[t]he value of any Work covered by a Change Order or Work Directive
Change or of any claim for an increase or decrease in the Contract Price shall be
determined in one of the following ways . . .") (emphasis added)). Of course, if only
City-authorized Change Orders could increase the Contract Price, there would be no need
for the additional language of Section 11.1(c) for any other "claim."5 See Jones v. ERA

5

West Jordan argues that KPM misunderstands Section 11.1(c), which it asserts "merely
describes how a City-authorized adjustment is to be valued." Brief of Appellee at 22.
This only begs the question posited by KPM. If "[t]he Contract Price may only be
changed by a City-approved Change Order" as defined in Section 11.1(b) (R. 51
o

Brokers Consol, 6 P.3d 1129, 1131 (Utah 2000) (stating that contract provisions should
be interpreted by a court "in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect
to all and ignoring none.
Under the common law rule of commercial impracticability, as adopted by Utah,
KPM has such a claim to increase the Contract Price according to Section 11.1(c)
because the Contract does not explicitly allocate to KPM the risk of an unexpected 300%
rise in cost of liquid asphalt oil. The district court erroneously concluded that KPM
contracted for this risk without considering the degree of difficulty to KPM and whether
the unforeseen increase was "well beyond the normal range" of contract expectation. See
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261, cmt. c and d; see also Aluminum Co. of Am. v.
Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 73 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that "[t]he increase in
cost of performance [was] sever enough" in relation to the contract price, specifically, a
574.2% increase in costs, to warrant relief under the doctrine of impracticability). In
deciding West Jordan's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the district court should have
considered these fact questions in favor of KPM and not ruled that an assumption of risk
of normal cost increases necessarily forecloses any claim of impracticability. R. 242-43
{Minute Entry).

(emphasis added)), then an adjustment to the Contract Price "for any claim" other than a
Change Order becomes meaningless.
10

II.

KPM does not improperly invoke the doctrine of impracticability as a
"sword" to "rewrite" the Contract.
Contrary to West Jordan's averment, KPM's affirmative claim is not contrary to

the common law doctrine of impracticability and does not seek to "rewrite" the Contract.
Brief of Appellee at 13-14, 18-19.
First, West Jordan cites no authority proscribing the use of impracticability as an
affirmative claim for damages. Although commonly asserted as a justification for lack of
performance, "[ljike the common law in general, the impossibility doctrine is sufficiently
flexible and adaptive to achieve just results dependent on the factual circumstances
presented to the court." Corbin on Contracts § 74.15. Impracticability is not prescribed
solely as a defense.

Significantly, West Jordan does not argue against the general

proposition that impracticability can be "treated as a type of constructive change to the
contract," thus entitling a contractor to equitable adjustment.

Raytheon, 305 F.3d at

1367. And it does not argue that lack of a specific clause in a given agreement precludes
equitable adjustment. See M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dept. ofTransp., 19A A.2d 141, 14950 (NJ. 2002). In this case, the impracticability caused by the rise in cost of liquid
asphalt should be treated as a type of constructive change—i.e. modification—of the
Contract, thus allowing for an adjustment of the Contract Price consistent with Section
11.1(c).6

6

West Jordan misunderstands the purpose for KPM citing these two cases. Brief of
Appellee at 14-16. The issue is not whether the City modified the Contract, but whether
the doctrine of impracticability, as articulated by Raytheon, supra, would allow for the
drastic rise in cost to KPM to be treated as a constructive change. If so, then KPM would
be entitled to an "equitable adjustment" of the Contract Price, notwithstanding the
11

Second, as discussed above, Section 11.1(c) provides a formula for increases in
the Contract Price according to Sections 11.2 and 11.4. R. 52-55. These provisions
provide for "the value of Work" to be determined by the "Cost of Work," specifically,
"the sum of all costs necessarily incurred and paid by the Contractor [KPM] for labor,
materials, and equipment, plus Contractor's overhead, and profit in the proper
performance of the work." R. 51 (Sections 11.1(c) and 11.2(a)). Sections 11.2(c) and
11.4 further include terms that define these amounts. R. 52, 54-55. The formula to
determine the increase in Contract Price for KPM's commercial impracticability claim is
set by the Contract and there is no need to rewrite its terms. KPM's claim merely
compels West Jordan to compensate KPM according to the change it requested and
which the City should have approved. R. 3 {Complaint at ^f 12-15).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, and those set forth in its principal brief, KPM respectfully
requests the Court reject West Jordan's arguments and reinstate its impracticability claim
in the district court.

absence of a price escalation or similar clause, because the language of Section 11.1(c)
plausibly permits the same. Cf MJ. Paquet, 794 A.2d at 153-54 (finding the relevant
contract provision ambiguous, plausibly allowing for the adjustment, and identifying
other independent equitable grounds to justify the claim).
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